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Abstract. The study is an attempt to investigate the nature of competition and market contestability of 35 
Pakistani banks for the period of 2007-2011 by employing Panzar and Rosse (PR-model). The test of 
competition overall sample (2007-2011) suggest that banks in Pakistan in state of monopolistic competition 
and market is in equilibrium. The sub sample (2007-2009) result of competition and equilibrium are similar 
as for sample period (2007-2011) suggesting that revenue produced during this period is state of monopolistic 
competition. Finally the results of sample period (2010-2011) suggest that banks in Pakistan are instate of 
perfect competition however, the market in not in long-run equilibrium. The results have interesting policy 
implications; it is suggested to encourage the foreign banks presence to improve the competitive condition of 
banking industry so that to ensure the exit and entrance of banks in the industry to increase the competition 
and produce the variety of product to improve banks performance and customer satisfaction.  
Keywords: Bank Competition, Market contestability, Market Equilibrium  
 
1  Introduction 
 
The nature of competition in banking industry and its contribution to economic and financial stability, 
growth, improvement of quality services has been the hot topic of discussion of the researcher. 
However, the severe need to explore this topic was felt after global financial and economic crises. The 
need to explore the nature of competition in banking sector was felt due to number of reasons. The 
bank competition contribute on enhance the quality of services. The competing banks put their efforts 
to gain maximum share of profit. If the market is competitive then profit earning without quality of 
services would be impossible. The competition leads innovation.  The relationship of bank 
competition to economic stability and growth can be found in work of (Vives, 2001). Competiting 
banks provides better loan facility and borrower (individual and institutional) can have better access to 
loan. Better available finance can result in promote investment and may lead economic growth. The 
pros and cons are disused in various studies. However, the argument is no yet clear.  
The link of competition, economic stability, growth and quality of services is given by theory of 
economics called “Theory of Market Contestability”.  Baumol (1982) argues that there are small 
numbers of contestants. Markets behave in competitive way due to the pressure of new entrants. The 
theory assumes that the products are identical and market is in equilibrium. Due to fear of pressure of 
new entrants in the market urge the existing firm to produce the quality products. The firm must 
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produce the efficient and economical products to survive in the market. When the firm raises its prices 
the potential new entrant will enter the market by setting comparatively low prices to capture the 
market. If the competing firm who has raised the prices does not respond in time, then the new entrant 
will distort their profit and take the market share. If the competing firm respond and adjust the prices 
then firm will run out of market. Any disturbance in equilibrium will cause entry of new entry. Thus 
the competition brings stability of market and contributes to the quality financial services. 
Lerner (1934) argues that theoretical model of market competition considers the direct measure of 
competition “markup above cost” for testing the competition in banking industry. However, due to 
shortage of private data of banks limits to study the bank competition as suggested by theory. Majority 
of studies use various proxies for testing the bank competition. Thus indirect measure of bank of bank 
competition is practical. Two types of model can be seen in financial intermediation literature for 
testing the bank competition indirectly. Structural model of bank competition uses the most famous 
proxy for bank competition call “Herfindal-Herchman Index (HHI)” for measuring bank competition. 
The HHI is basically the bank concentration ratio. High concentration more the bank will be 
competitive (Mason, 1939; Bain, 1951). This model of measurement of the bank competition is highly 
criticized for its weakness. The market concentration and structure is not true measure of bank 
competition. Structure and concentration can miss the true measure of market power and competition 
(Shaffer, 1993, 1989, 2004; Shaffer & Disalvo, 1994; Claessens & Leaven, 2004). The second model 
is non-structural model. This model considers the bank specific variables and bank entry, existence of 
foreign banks etc. 
We are using non-structural model based on Panzar-Rosse (Rosse & Panzar, 1977; Panzar & Rosse, 
1982, 1987) approach to test the nature of market competition in banking sector of Pakistan. We have 
checked the market contestability theory for Pakistan. Furthermore, the size and presence of foreign 
impact checked is also checked. 
The study is of extreme significance as the banking industry in Pakistan is considered the economy 
strong side and all banks compete for their activities.   This competition can be seen in its basic role 
which they play in the economy. Generally speaking the Bank role in Pakistani economy can be 
categorized into two important aspects based on the functions the banks perform; primary and 
secondary functions. The bank primary function includes accepting deposit and advances. Bank 
provides current deposit, fixed deposit, saving deposit and recurring deposit to serve the customer 
under the head of accepting deposits. Bank advances includes overdraft, cash credit, loan and 
discounting of bills. Secondary function like agency function and utility function facilitates transfer of 
funds, periodic payments, and collection of checks, portfolio management, periodic collections, 
overdraft, lockers, underwriting, and social welfare programs. These banks compete for these activities 
applying various strategies. The presence of foreign banks and local bank competing for maximum 
share would determine the nature of competition. If the bank is competitive, then it would lead to 
provide better financial services and financial stability. 
Our contribution lies in two halves; first we have applied the Rosse-Panzar approach to check the 
nature of competition in banking industry of Pakistan. This method is for the first time used in the 
literature related to Pakistan. Secondly, indirect approach is used by using various proxies. The 
presence of foreign banks and size effect is also incorporated to check the competition in banking 
industry. The study includes all commercial banks and foreign banks in Pakistan. The study is 
organized in the four sections. Section 1 gives the brief introduction, literature review in section 2, 
section 3 contains model. Finally, results and conclusion are given in section 4. 
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2  Literature Review 
 
This portion of study gives the brief review of studies conducted by other researcher on different 
aspects of competition. The literature covers four important aspects of competition. First aspects of 
literature give the general effects of presence of competition in banking industry where the researchers 
have discussed the bank competition theoretically. What can be the possible effects of competition in 
banking industry? The second aspect consists of studies who studied the bank competition empirically. 
They applied various models on secondary data and arrive at the possible effects of bank competition. 
The third aspect of literature consists of the researchers who have tested the “Theory of Market 
Contestability”. The fourth aspect consists of the researcher who tested the nature of competition, 
where the banks applies various pricing strategies to earn under monopoly or perfect competition or 
monopolistic competition.  
Generally speaking the competition in market can improve the quality of service, efficiency and 
performance of competing firms. However the relationship is complex. Vives (2001) tested the 
relationship among the stability, growth, performance and bank competition. He argues that the 
competition may improve the performance of competing firms but the nature of competition and 
relationship of these variables is more complex than we thought.  Firm access to financing can be 
improved by the market power (Petersen & Rajan, 1995).  
As far as the empirical studies literature is concerned we found numerous studies on the topic of 
competition. The researcher considers the bank concentration as indicator of competition. Berger and 
Hannan (1991) estimated the relationship of bank concentration in market and performance for U.S.A. 
The data taken into account was from 1983-1985. He concluded that lager market share of bank 
produce greater efficiency. More specifically, the banks that have greater share are more efficient. To 
some researcher suggest that the bank consolidation is the key factor that affects the access to 
financing (Gilbert, 1984; Berger, Demsetz & Strahan, 1999). 
Like the bank consolidation which is considered as the major role in competitive environment other 
factors like the bank regulation and bank specific structure also have the impact on the competitive 
environment and also determines the performance of banks. The researcher links the regulatory 
environment to competition and performance. Bath, Caprio and Levine (2001) surveyed the bank 
regulation and restriction in large sample of countries of the world. They noted down the exit and 
entry requirement of the banks in various countries. The data collected was used for the exploration of 
link of the regulatory requirements and the efficiency of banks. The extra regulatory requirements 
increase the overhead expenses of the bank and result in increased cost and indirectly decrease the 
profits. The revolutionary article published in 2001. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) concluded that 
more tight entry requirement less would the bank efficiency. Furthermore, the foreign bank presence 
was considered as the main variable that increases the competition. If the regulatory restriction are so 
harsh were the foreign banks are not able to enter then it cause the limit competition and increase 
fragility of banking system.  
Researcher links the foreign bank presence is one of the determinant of bank competition and 
efficiency of domestic banks. Classens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) investigated the entry of 
foreign banks entry and domestic bank efficiency. He concludes that domestic bank efficiency can be 
improved by the entry of new banks. Berger, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) investigated 
the relationship of concentration, bank regulation and efficiency of bank. He concluded that more 
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concentrated banks are less efficient. He puts the restriction, and argues that this would be true only 
for rich countries where banks are free (with less restriction) and have developed system. 
The literature related to test of “Theory of Market Contestability” argues that there are large numbers 
of banks that compete for profits in the market. If bank go for high profits above the average market 
level then the new entrants will capture the market share by setting the prices comparatively low. The 
test of competition under the theory of market contestability is modeled by two different approaches. 
The first approach is call structural approach which is based on (Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982). Such 
model uses the basic idea of market equilibrium where the marginal revenues become equal to 
marginal cost. The price strategy of the banks depends on the market equilibrium. If the firm wan to 
earn profit then it considers the equilibrium condition to set the prices such that revenue exceeds the 
cost. This model is used as direct measure of competition in the market and also determine the nature 
of competition. 
The second approach is call Panzar-Rosse (PR) model which is given by (Rosse & Panzar, 1977; 
Panzar & Rosse, 1982, 1987). This model of measure of measure of competition links the bank input 
and output. More specifically the bank cost as input and output as profit. The outputs are dependent on 
input. The whole model is based on bank revenue equation. Most of researcher use reduced form of 
such equation to estimate the input and output of banks. It is basically the sensitivity of bank revenue 
when bank cost change. If one percent of bank revenue change what would happen to its cost under 
various market condition such as perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition. The PR developed a statistics called “H-Statistics” to measure the nature of competition 
among the banks.  
In finance literature we found numerous studies that use PR model to measure the nature on 
competition in banking sector of various countries. Studies base on PR model show mixed results. 
Nathan and Neave (1989) studied the nature of competition among the banks in Canada from 1982-
1984 and concluded that the Canadian banks are operating under monopolistic competition. Shaffer 
(1983) studied the banking competition for New York for the period of 1979, rejected the hypothesis 
of perfect competition, monopoly and oligopoly. He argues that a bank in New York operates under 
monopolistic competition. Molyneux, Lloyd-William sand Thornton, (1994) studied the nature of 
competition in banking system of five countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK) for the period 
of 1986-1989 and concluded mixed results. He found monopoly for Italian banks and monopolistic 
competition for France, Germany, Spain, and UK. Vesala (1995) tested nature of competition for 
Finland for the period of 1985-1992 and concluded that a bank in Finland operates under monopolistic 
competition. Molyneux, Thornton and Lloyd-Williams (1996) studied the banking competition for 
Japan for the period of 1986-1988.  They argues that the bank in Japan were in monopoly in 1986 and 
monopolistic competition in 1988. Coccorese (1998) studied the nature of banking competition in Italy 
and concluded that the Italian banks operate under monopolistic competition for sample period (1988-
1996). De Bandt and Davis (2000) studied the bank competition for three countries France, Germany 
and Italy for period of 1992-1996. He argues that large banks in all countries operate under the 
monopolistic competition and small banks of Italy are in monopolistic competition.  The small banks 
in France and Germany are in monopoly. Hondroyiannis, Sarantis and Papapetrou (1999) studied the 
banking system and competition of Greece for the period of 19931995 and concluded that bank in 
Greece are in monopolistic competition. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) tested the banking competition 
in fifteen European countries for the period of 1989-1996 and concluded that all bank are in 
monopolistic competition. Bikker and Haaf (2002) studied bank competition in twenty three 
industrialized countries for period of 1988-1998. They observed monopolistic competition in whole 
sample countries, however, monopoly of small banks in Australia and Greece. Large bank of the 
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sample were in monopolistic competition in general and with some exception where they observed 
perfect competition. 
  
3  Data and Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
The data is taken from “State Bank of Pakistan” website. The state bank of Pakistan issue annual 
financial statement of all banks for all banks on the website. The data includes all banks operating in 
Pakistan including foreign banks, commercial banks, saving banks, investment banks etc., total 
number of banks 38 where 7 banks are foreign banks operating in Pakistan. Data set includes from 
2007 to 2011. We have used panel annual data for five year of all banks operating in Pakistan. We 
have dropped the two banks as their data was incomplete for whole study period. Thus we have thirty 
six banks. Thus the final sample consists of 185 banking years. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
We used PR-approach (Rosse & Panzar, 1977; Panzar & Rosse, 1982, 1987) to explore the nature of 
competition in Pakistani banking industry. PR-approch suggests that banks use various pricing 
strategies to capture the required cost and profit operating under various market conditions. The 
market situation can be monopoly, perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly or natural 
monopoly where the market in pierce competition. PR-approach use bank revenue reduced form 
equation to capture the possible effects of change in bank revenue as response to change in cost. If we 
call the cost as input prices and revenue as output prices then we can say that degree to which the 
output prices are sensitive to input prices. This sensitivity of output price as response to change in 
input prices is called “PR-H-statistics”. The PR-H-Statistics will define the nature of competition as 
suggested by PR-approach. 
We have developed the relationship of the variables on the basis of PR-approach based on the reduced 
form bank revenue equation. The equation (1) and (2) is estimated by applying bank specific fixed 
effect model. In order to test the competitive environment of Pakistani banking industry in the context 
of PR-approach (modified by Claessens & Leaven, 2004) we can write the situation as, 
ln() =
 +  ln() +  ln() +  ln() +	 ln() +  ln() +  ln() +  +  +   (1) 
Where “i” and “t” represents bank and year respectively. 
IRit   =  Gross Interest revenue divided by Total Assets which is used as proxy for bank Output prices 
IEit    =  Interest Expense divided by Total Deposits which is used as proxy for input cost 
PEit   =  Personal Expenses (Salaries of staff) divided by Total Assets which is used as proxy for input cost 
of labor. 
OEit =   Operating Expenses and administrative Expenses divided by Total Assets as a proxy for cost of 
fixed assets 
ETit = Equity divided by Total Asset 
NLTit = Net loan divided by Total Asset 
TAit = Natural Log of Total asset used as proxy for size effect 
D      =   Year dummy  
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iµ
= bank specific fixed effect 
The PR-H-Statistics is defined as sum of coefficients of IE, PE and OE i.e.  
(H= )321 βββ ++ . 
The   “H-Statistics” can have the value less than or equal to zero, between the zero and one, or equal to 
one.  
If the value of “H≤0” would mean that banking industry in Pakistan operates under monopoly or short 
run oligopoly.  
When the “H=1” then we would say that the banking industry is in state of perfect competition, natural 
monopoly.  
If we found “0<H<1” then we can say that banks in Pakistan are operating under monopolistic 
competition.  
In case of first type of market environment where “H≤0” we would expect the negative relationship of 
bank revenues and cost, meaning that if there is increase in cost of input then the marginal cost will 
decrease the amount of equilibrium production and ultimately the revenues which is generated from 
the that production.   
In case of second market situation where “H=1” we expect positive relationship (1% change in cost 
will bring one 1% change in revenues) between cost and revenues, meaning that increase in input cost 
will increase the equilibrium production and ultimately the revenues. In case of perfect competition 
the bank will try to increase their revenues by the same proportion as their cost increases. If one bank 
fails achieve this objective his survival in the market will be difficult and efficient bank will acquire 
the weak bank. When the bank in economy decrease in number then supply of services will decreased 
and results in increased revenues.  
The third case where H-statistics lies between zero and one is given by state of monopolistic 
competition as the revenues does not increase or decrease with that proportion with which the cost has 
increased. We call the revenues as decreasing function of demand elasticity. On the basis of above 
discussion we have the following hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 1:    H0: H=0      
Hypothesis2: H0: H=1 
 Hypothesis3: H0: 0<H<1 
  
As equilibrium condition is considered necessary of PR-approach. Therefore, we tested the 
equilibrium condition by the following equation. 
itiDitTAitNLTitETitOEitPEIEitROA it εηδγγγβββα +++++++++= )ln(3)ln(2)ln(1)(3)ln(2)ln()ln( 1   (2) 
The entire variables are same as in equation (1) except return on asset which is equal to Income before 
Taxes divided by total assets. The equilibrium is checked by the value of equilibrium statistics (E-
Statistics) which is given by “E-Statistics= .321 βββ ++  if the sum of these co-efficient is equal to 
zero would mean that market is in long-run equilibrium. Alternatively, if “E<0” mean disequilibrium. 
The statistical significance of E-statistics is checked by applying the F-test. 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  
Issue 1(33)/2014                                                                                               ISSN: 1582-8859 
 
BANKING, FINANCE & ACCOUNTING 
 
73 
 
4  Results 
 
We have divided the results into three main categories on the basis of division of data. Separate 
equations have been estimated for three categories, the test of competition and test of equilibrium. The 
data division includes fixed effect model estimation from 2007 to 2011 (whole sample period). 
Secondly, sub sample from 2007 to 2009 and finally from 2010 to 2011. The results of test of 
equilibrium and test of competition for first category (from2007-2011) are reported in Table1 and 
Table2. Results of sub sample (2007-2009) are reported in Table 3 and Table 4. Finally results of test 
of competition and equilibrium for the last category (2010-2011) are reported in Table 5 and Table 6. 
Each table contains the details of variable, fixed effect model test, H-statistics and our basic 
hypothesis. 
 
4.1 Test of Competition and Test of Equilibrium for Sample Period 2007-2011 
As suggested by PR-Model the basic results are the interpretation of H-statistics which is given by 
sum of elasticity of cost inputs given in equation (1).  
The H-statistics is calculated by 
321 βββ ++=H  
and statistical significance is checked by F-test.  
Similarly, the equilibrium statistics (E-Statistics) is given by 
321 βββ ++=E  
in equation (2) and to check its statistical significance we apply F-test.  
Now we proceed to discuss the competitive condition and equilibrium test of all three categories of 
data. 
 
4.1.1  Test of  Competition for Sample Period 2007-2011 
The results are reported in Table 2. Before we go for the formal investigation of the test of competition 
we present the secondary result of fixed effect model reported in bottom of Table 2 (H0: ηi=0 F 
(34,122) =2.669366*   (P-Value=0.0000)).  
The results show that we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative at 5% level of 
significance. It explains that bank specific fixed effect exist in the data we can estimate the fixed effect 
model. The results reported of the (R2 = 0.794383) show that the explanatory variable are very much 
capable of explaining the 80% of dependent variable. The explanation of individual variable 
coefficients and its statistical significance is not our primary objective and for the sake of brevity we 
have reported these results only in this sample period only (2007-2011). All individual variables of the 
equation (1) are statistically significant at 5% level of significance. The positive and significant 
coefficients of the variable (IE), (PE), and (OE) shows that higher price of inputs funds (input 
elements) produce higher revenue for banks. The statistically significant and negative coefficient of 
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(ET) indicates that banks whose equity is lower and these banks are more risky and as result produce 
more revenues. If we look at variable (TA) is statistically significant and positive at 5% level of 
significance, indicates that the larger the bank produce more revenues than smaller banks. Finally, the 
positive and significant coefficient of (NLT) (at 5% level of significance) indicates that the banks who 
provide larger loan produce high revenues. 
Now we come to our basic results (H-statistics and our basic hypothesis) reported in the bottom of 
Table 2.  As for as our basic hypothesis are concerned we are rejecting the null hypothesis at 5% of 
level in both cases (H0: H=0) and (H0: H=1). But we fail to reject the null hypothesis (H0: 0<H<1). 
Thus it means that the H-value lies between zero and one.  
For the statistical significance of these hypotheses we have used the F-test. The F-statistics and 
corresponding p-value are reported at the bottom of Table2. The H-statistics value reported in the 
Table 2 is 0.375 indicating that the banks in Pakistan are in state of monopolistic competition for the 
period of 2007-2011 as the revenues does not increase with that proportion with which the cost has 
increased. We call the revenues as decreasing function of demand elasticity. This phenomenon has 
interesting effects on bank revenues in a short-run and long run differently. In the short run the bank 
may earn abnormal profits when it has low average cost than its average revenues. However if the 
bank average cost is more than its average revenues the bank will experience losses. But in the long-
run the bank has somewhat different behavior. If the banks earn short-run abnormal profits, will attract 
other bank to enter the market as a result the supply will increase and prices will lower adjusting the 
abnormal profits to normal. For the banks who experience the losses in short run will quiet the market 
and supply will decrease as a result the prices increase enough to get the profits in long run. 
Furthermore if the competitor bank produce differentiated products (expands outputs) can cause the 
leading profitable banks to share its profits due to the supply effect. As the output put (expanded 
supply of differentiated products by competitors) supply increase can lower the prices can influence 
the leading profitable banks and new entry with expanded supply of products can take the profits from 
existing competitors (or can take customer from competing bank shrinking the demand). Banks that 
can have quality products at this point of time may act like monopolists. However in the tested bank 
market we have both the foreign banks presence and merger and acquisitions, resisting violating this 
situation with employing expanded supply of differentiated products. Thus the combining the short run 
and long run effect of such competition the market remain in state of equilibrium. 
 
4.1.2  Test of  Equilibrium for Sample Period 2007-2011 
The equilibrium test is conducted after estimation of equation (2). The results are reported in Table 1. 
According to PR-model specification the equilibrium statistics (E-statistics) is given by (E=
)321 βββ ++ in equation (2) and its statistical significance is checked by F-test.  
The result presented in table 1 shows that fail to reject the null hypothesis (H0:E=0) at 5% level of 
significance level suggesting that market is in equilibrium. The secondary result (H0: ηi=0      
F(34,122)= 3.534639*   (P-Value=0.0000) ) of fixed effect model is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level suggesting that the fixed effect model best to explain the characteristics of such data. 
Finally the (R2 = 0.659393) suggest that the independent variable cause 65% variation in ROA. 
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4.2  Test of Competition and Test of Equilibrium for Sample Period 2007-2009 
 
4.2.1    Test of Competition for Sample Period 2007-2009 
A result reported in Table 4 provides the details of nature of competition in Pakistani banks for sample 
period 2007-2009. The hypothesis given in bottom of Table 4 (H0: H=0) and (H0: H=1) both are 
rejected at 5% level of significance but we are unable to reject (H0: 0<H<1) suggesting that the H-
statistics value lies between zero and one. Hence we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that banks 
in Pakistan are competing monopolistically.  
The statistical significance is checked by F-test and their coefficients along with p-value are given in 
Table 4. When we sum up the elasticity of input cost variable (H= )321 βββ ++ in equation (1) we 
found the value of H-statistics equals to (0.509).  The value is reported in Table 4. This value also 
confirmed that the banks in Pakistan are in state of monopolistic competition. The result of fixed effect 
test are also significant at 5% level of significance suggesting that fixed effect model is best to 
estimate such type of data. 
 
4.2.2    Test of Equilibrium for Sample Period 2007-2009 
The result of test of equilibrium for the sample period 2007-2009 is reported in Table 3. The result 
show that the we are unable to reject the null hypothesis (H0: E=0) at 5% level of significance 
suggesting that market is in long run equilibrium for sample period 2007-2009. The F-statistics and 
corresponding p-value are reported in Table 3. The null hypothesis of redundant fixed effect test is 
rejected at 5% level of significance. The R-squared value is 0.72 indicating that the independent 
variables are very much capable of explaining the variation in ROA. 
 
4.3  Test of Competition and Test of Equilibrium for Sample Period 2010-2011 
This section has somewhat interesting results reported in Table 5 and Table 6 (Table 5 for competition 
and Table 6 for equilibrium test). The results reported in Table 5 shows that we are rejecting the null 
hypothesis (H0: H=0) but we could not reject the null hypothesis (H0: H=1) at 5% level of 
significance. The F-statistics and its corresponding p-value are given in the bottom of Table 5. Thus on 
the basis of such results we can argue that the banks in for period of 2010-2011 are seem to be in state 
of perfect competition. It we look at the value of H-statistics reported in Table 5 we would notice that 
it is about 1.082531 confirms that market situation are in perfectly competitive it seems that (1% 
change in cost will bring one 1% change in revenues). Increase in input cost will increase the 
equilibrium production and ultimately the revenues. In case of perfect competition the bank will try to 
increase their revenues by the same proportion as their cost increases. If one bank fails achieve this 
objective his survival in the market will be difficult and efficient bank will acquire the weak bank. 
When the bank in economy decrease in number then supply of services will decreased and results in 
increased revenues. Although, the model is good as it has the R-squared value 0.60 and fixed effect 
test coefficient are also significant at 5% level of significance, yet we have a problem. The results 
reported in Table 6 the test of equilibrium we rejected the null hypothesis that (H0: E=0) meaning that 
market for the sample period of 2010-2011 are in state of dis-equilibrium. So we would need to handle 
the result with caution. However, such result one might expect in country like Pakistan because of 
privatization, incorporation of new technology and especially the merger and acquisition of banks 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  
Issue 1(33)/2014                                                                                               ISSN: 1582-8859 
 
BANKING, FINANCE & ACCOUNTING 
 
76 
taken place in study period. As whole the equilibrium model is good having R-squared value 0.93 and 
fixed effect redundant test coefficient is also significant. 
 
5  Conclusion  
  
Study investigated the competition and contestability of 35 banks from 2007 to 2011. The study 
applied the Panzar and Rossee (1987) model to test the competition and market equilibrium of 
Pakistani banks. Separate equation of competition and equilibrium are estimated. We keep the interest 
revenue and return on asset as dependent variable in these equations respectively. These equations also 
include the bank specific control variable.  All the equations estimated are estimated on the basis of 
bank specific fixed effect model. Furthermore, the data is divided into three halves for sake of 
estimation, i.e., 2007-2011, 2007-2009 and 2010-2011. 
Test of competition and equilibrium equation for sample period 2007-2011 confirms the presence of 
monopolistic competition among Pakistani banks and market is in long run equilibrium. The result of 
sub sample 2007-2009 are somewhat similar to that of 2007-2011 which show that we could not reject 
the null hypothesis of  monopolistic competition for the said sample period. The market is also in long 
run equilibrium. However, the result of sub sample 2010-2011 confirms that the banks are in state of 
perfect competition but market is not in equilibrium enforcing us to handle the result with cautions. 
As for as secondary result and the model specification, individual variable are concerned, fixed effect 
model is significant in all equations. The R-squared value and other criteria of best model are fulfilled.  
The results of individual variable description are given only for the whole period (2007-2008). The 
results given in (2007-2011) sample period all the individual variables are significant (both the input 
cost variable and banks specific variable). The input price of funds has the positive relationship with 
the banks revenue. The equity and revenue relationship is negative suggesting that a risky bank has 
produced more revenues. The size variable has positive relationship with the revenues suggesting that 
the larger banks are well capable of earning high revenues as compared to small banks. The banks that 
has larger loan giving facility earn higher revenues.  
 
6  Appendix  
 
Table 1 Test of equilibrium of sample period 2007-2011 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.162785 0.038164 -4.265377 0.0000* 
IE -0.000668 0.004056 -1.644100 0.1027 
PE -0.000739 0.005446 -2.155559 0.0331* 
OE -0.000715 0.004751 -0.150468 0.8806 
ET 0.013803 0.002895 4.767147 0.0000* 
NLT 0.001340 0.006858 0.195457 0.8454 
TA 0.007502 0.002182 3.438778 0.0008* 
D8 -0.006717 0.004386 -1.531525 0.1282 
D9 -0.005651 0.004785 -1.180978 0.2399 
D10 -0.004899 0.004720 -1.038070 0.3013 
D11 0.003530 0.005092 0.693311 0.4894 
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R2                0.659393 
H0: ηi=0      F(34,122)= 3.534639*   (P-Value=0.0000) 
H0: E=0        F(1, 122)= 20.65516*    (P-Value=0.3155) 
*indicates variable is significant at 5% significance level 
Table 2 Test of competition of sample period 2007-2011 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -2.400066 0.449217 -5.342780 0.0000* 
IE 0.118323 0.047737 2.478665 0.0146* 
PE 0.106194 0.064102 1.656650 0.0002* 
OE 0.151469 0.055924 2.708475 0.0077* 
ET -0.033248 0.034082 -0.975528 0.0312* 
NLT 0.280616 0.080718 3.476485 0.0007* 
TA 0.058258 0.025679 2.268693 0.0250* 
D9 0.162743 0.056319 2.889633 0.0046* 
D8 0.116325 0.051621 2.253430 0.0260* 
D11 0.269948 0.059937 4.503824 0.0000* 
D10 0.147069 0.055552 2.647386 0.0092* 
 
    
R2                0.794383 
H0: ηi=0      F(34,122)=2.669366*   (P-Value=0.0000) 
H0: H=0       F(1, 122)= 21.49271*    (P-Value=0.0000) 
H0: H=1       F(1, 122)= 45.79215*   (P-Value=0.0000) 
H0: 0<H<1 fail to reject 
H-statistics  0.375 
*indicates variable is significant at 5% significance level 
 
 
Table 3 Test of equilibrium of sample period 2007-2009 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.402956 0.275990 -1.460038 0.1495 
IE -0.020028 0.009186 -2.180419 0.0332* 
PE -0.007604 0.007291 -1.042932 0.3012 
OE 0.002358 0.006368 0.370196 0.7125 
ET 0.018067 0.005946 3.038320 0.0035* 
NLT 0.010975 0.018554 0.591503 0.5564 
TA 0.021123 0.015354 1.375685 0.1740 
D08 -0.007222 0.005686 -1.270235 0.2089 
D09 -0.004644 0.007072 -0.656651 0.5139 
 
    
R2                0.728920 
H0: ηi=0      F(33,60)= 2.786103*   (P-Value=0.0003) 
H0: E=0        F(1, 60)= 2.370109*    (P-Value= 0.1289) 
*indicates variable is significant at 5% significance level 
 
Table 4 Test of competition of sample period 2007-2009 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -3.353128 1.875407 -1.787947 0.0388* 
IE 0.413441 0.062418 6.623734 0.0000* 
PE 0.035560 0.049546 0.717715 0.0477* 
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OE 0.061781 0.043275 1.427663 0.0533* 
ET 0.069651 0.040406 1.723791 0.0899 
NLT 0.341060 0.126080 2.705113 0.0089 
TA 0.141725 0.104336 1.358353 0.005* 
D08 0.041457 0.038637 1.072981 0.2876 
D09 0.064475 0.048053 1.341751 0.1847 
 
    
 
    
 
    
R2                0.64383 
H0: ηi=0      F(33,60)= 7.131167*   (P-Value=0.0000) 
H0: H=0       F(1, 60)= 2.334911*    (P-Value= 0.0318) 
H0: H=1       F(1, 60)= 4.219752*   (P-Value= 0.0443) 
H-statistics  0.509 
*indicates variable is significant at 5% significance level 
 
 
Table 5 Test of competition of sample period 2010-2011 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -4.417791 2.747756 -1.607781 0.0195* 
IE 0.716432 0.113779 6.296713 0.0000* 
PE 0.367082 0.343911 1.067374 0.052* 
OE -0.000983 0.350372 -0.002805 0.9978 
ET 0.032689 0.051188 0.638600 0.5285 
NLT 0.169723 0.194067 0.874558 0.3895 
TA 0.282632 0.160897 1.756600 0.003* 
 
    
R2                0.60344 
H0: ηi=0      F(33,27)= 10.565376*   (P-Value=0.0000) 
H0: H=0       F(1, 26)= 2. 291602*    (P-Value= 0.0318) 
H0: H=1       F(1, 26)= 0.078951*   (P-Value=  0.7809) 
H-statistics  1.082531 
*indicates variable is significant at 5% significance level 
 
Table 6 Test of equilibrium of sample period 2010-2011 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -0.847079 0.237831 -3.561687 0.0014* 
IE 0.010025 0.009848 1.018017 0.3177 
PE 0.029646 0.029767 0.995921 0.3281 
OE -0.033955 0.030326 -1.119642 0.2727 
ET 0.022302 0.004431 5.033732 0.0000* 
NLT 0.041984 0.016797 2.499420 0.0188* 
TA 0.050998 0.013926 3.661964 0.0011* 
 
    
R2               0.933818 
H0: ηi=0      F(33,27)= 6.939077*   (P-Value=0.0000) 
H0: E=0        F(1, 27)=  11.97928*    (P-Value=  0.0018) 
*indicates variable is significant at 5% significance level 
 
 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  
Issue 1(33)/2014                                                                                               ISSN: 1582-8859 
 
BANKING, FINANCE & ACCOUNTING 
 
79 
7  References  
 
Bain J S (1951): Relation of profit rate to industry concentration: American manufacturing, 1936–1940. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 65(3): 293-324. 
Barth J R , Caprio G  & Levine R (2001): The regulation and supervision of banks around the world: A new database (Vol. 
2588). World Bank Publications. 
Barth J R, Caprio J G & Levine R (2001): Banking systems around the globe: Do regulation and ownership affect 
performance and stability?. In Prudential supervision: What works and what doesn't (pp. 31-96). University of Chicago 
Press. 
Hannan T H  & Berger A N (1991): The rigidity of prices: Evidence from the banking industry. The American Economic 
Review, 81(4): 938-945. 
Berger A N, Demirgüç-Kunt A, Levine R  & Haubrich J G (2004): Bank concentration and competition: An evolution in the 
making. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 433-451. 
Berger A N, Demsetz R S & Strahan P E (1999): The consolidation of the financial services industry: Causes, 
consequences, and implications for the future. Journal of Banking & Finance, 23(2): 135-194. 
Baumol W J (1982): Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory of industry structure. American economic review, 
72(1):1-15. 
Bresnahan T F (1982): The oligopoly solution concept is identified. Economics Letters, 10(1): 87-92. 
Bikker J A & Groeneveld J M (2000): Competition and concentration in the EU banking industry. Kredit und Kapital, 33(1): 
62-98. 
Bikker J A & Haaf K (2002): Competition, concentration and their relationship: An empirical analysis of the banking 
industry. Journal of Banking & Finance, 26(11): 2191-2214. 
Claessens S,  Demirgüç-Kunt A  & Huizinga H (2001): How does foreign entry affect domestic banking markets?. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 25(5): 891-911. 
Claessens S & Laeven L (2004): What drives bank competition? Some international evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 563-583. 
Coccorese  P (1998): Assessing the competitive conditions in the Italian banking system: some empirical evidence. 
QUARTERLY REVIEW-BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO, 173-192. 
De Bandt O & Davis E P (2000): Competition, contestability and market structure in European banking sectors on the eve of 
EMU. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24(6): 1045-1066. 
Gilbert R A (1984): Bank market structure and competition: a survey. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 16(4): 617-
645. 
Hondroyiannis G, Lolos S & Papapetrou E (1999): Assessing competitive conditions in the Greek banking system. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 9(4): 377-391. 
Lau L J (1982): On identifying the degree of competitiveness from industry price and output data. Economics Letters, 10(1): 
93-99. 
Lerner A P (1934): The concept of monopoly and the measurement of monopoly power. The Review of Economic Studies, 
1(3): 157-175. 
Nathan A & Neave E H (1989): Competition and contestability in Canada's financial system: empirical results. Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 576-594. 
Molyneux P, J Thornton and Lloyd-Williams D M (1996): Competition and market contestability in the Japanese commercial 
banking market. Journal of Economics and Business 48: 33–45 
Mason E S (1939): Price and production policies of large-scale enterprise. The American Economic Review, 29(1): 61-74. 
Petersen M A & Rajan R G (1995): The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 110(2): 407-443. 
Rosse J N & Panzar J C (1977): Chamberlin vs. Robinson: an empirical test for monopoly rents. Bell Laboratories. 
Panzar J C & Rosse J N  (1982):  Structure, conduct, and comparative statistics. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Incorporated. 
Panzar J C & Rosse J N  (1987): Testing for" monopoly" equilibrium. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 443-456. 
Shaffer S  (1989): Competition in the US banking industry. Economics Letters, 29(4): 321-323. 
Shaffer S (1993):  Can megamergers improve bank efficiency?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 17(2): 423-436. 
Shaffer S  & DiSalvo  J (1994):  Conduct in a banking duopoly. Journal of Banking & Finance, 18(6): 1063-1082. 
Shaffer S (2004): Comment on" What Drives Bank Competition? Some International Evidence" by Stijn Claessens and Luc 
Laeven. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36(3): 585-592. 
Shaffer S (1983): The Rosse-Panzar statistic and the Lerner index in the short run. Economics Letters, 11(1): 175-178. 
Vesala J (1995): Testing for competition in banking: Behavioral evidence from Finland. Helsinki: Bank of Finland. 
Vives X (2001): Competition in the changing world of banking. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 17(4): 535-547. 
